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COMMENTS

RECOVERY BY THE RESCUER
The purpose of this Comment is to examine the approaches
utilized in Louisiana and other jurisdictions to determine the
liability of a rescued person, or a third person whose negligence
necessitated the rescue, for death or injury to a rescuer. The
leading cases have ignored both the quasi contract and negotiorum gestio theories, and have grounded their decisions exclusively on tort principles.
INTRODUCTION
Three basic situations may be distinguished in examining
the rescue problem. First, there is the case where the defendant
negligently imperils X or X's property, and plaintiff-rescuer,
placed by defendant's negligence in the dilemma of choosing
between his own safety and aiding X, chooses to intervene and
is harmed. The majority rule is that the defendant who is
negligent as to X is deemed to be negligent with relation to
potential rescuers as a class-persons who, though not in a position of primary danger because of defendant's negligent conduct,
may be stimulated to undertake a rescue which subjects them
to perils created by defendant's negligent conduct. The wrong
to X is also a breach of the duty owed to the prospective rescuer.'
The second situation is represented by cases in which defendant
negligently imperils himself, and plaintiff-rescuer is injured while
making a reasonable attempt to help defendant. The majority
position holds the defendant liable in these cases. 2 The third
situation involves a defendant who was not negligent with respect
to plaintiff until after plaintiff had begun his rescue effort. When
defendant's negligence occurred with relation to the stage of
plaintiff's rescue attempts is unimportant. The sole question and
that focused on by leading negligence decisions is whether defendant has created undue risk of harm. No emphasis is placed
upon the sequence of defendant's and plaintiff's acts, nor upon
1. See Marshall v. Nugent, 222 F.2d 604 (1st Cir. 1955), 58 A.L.R.2d 251
(1958), 17 N.A.C.C.A. L.J. 230 (1956); Grisby v. Coastal Marine Service of

Texas, Inc., 235 F. Supp. 97 (W.D. La. 1964); Lynch v. Fisher, 34 So.2d
513 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1948), modified, 41 So.2d 692 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1949),
4 A.L.R.3d 558 (1965); Wagner v. International Railway Co., 232 N.Y. 176,
133 N.E. 437 (1921); Annot., 19 A.L.R. 1 (1922).
2. See Henneman v. McCalla, 148 N.W.2d 447 (Iowa 1967); Gambino v.
Lubel, 190 So.2d 152 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 191 So.2d 639, 640,
642 (1966); Dodson v. Maddox, 359 Mo. 742, 223 S.W.2d 434 (1949); Ruth v.

Ruth, 213 Tenn. 82, 372 S.W.2d 285 (1963).
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the manner in which the harm is caused, nor upon the number
of events intervening between defendant's negligence and catastrophe.3
NATURE OF THE

DuTY

The leading case of Wagner v. International Ry. 4 dealt with
recovery by the rescuer from a third party tortfeasor. Through
negligent operation of defendant's train a passenger had been
thrown from a crowded car onto a trestle. Plaintiff was injured
when he fell through the trestle in attempting to effect a rescue.
Justice Cardozo said:
"Danger invites rescue. The cry of distress is the summons
to relief. The law does not ignore these reactions of the
mind in tracing conduct to its consequences. It recognizes
them as normal. It places their effects within the range
of the natural and probable. The wrong that imperils life
is a wrong to the imperiled victim; it is wrong also to the
rescuer. The risk of rescue, if only it be not wanton, is born
of the occasion. The emergency begets the man. The wrongdoer may not have foreseen the coming of a deliverer. He
is accountable as if he had."5
One has a legal and not merely a moral duty to avoid creating
perilous situations which invite rescue attempts.0 A rescue
is always foreseeable as a possible consequence of a negligent
act which places someone in peril. 7 The foreseeability of the
rescue attempt brings the rescuer within the scope of defendant's
3. See Richards v. Kansas Elec. Power Co., 126 Kan. 521, 268 P. 847
(1928); Gambino v. Lubel, 190 So.2d 152 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1966), cert. denied,
191 So.2d 639, 640, 642; Lynch v. Fisher, 34 So.2d 513 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1948),
modified, 41 So.2d 692 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1949), 4 A.L.R.3d 558 (1965) (recovery
denied against defendant shooting rescuer; see note 11 infra and accompanying text); Brown v. Ross, 345 Mich. 54, 75 N.W.2d 68 (1956); Hammonds v.
Haven, 280 S.W.2d 814 (Miss. 1955).
4. 232 N.Y. 176, 133 N.E. 437 (1921); Annot., 19 A.L.R. 1 (1922).
5. Id. at 180, 133 N.E. at 437.
6. See Notes, 20 ROCKY MT. L. Rsv. 414 (1948), 25 TEXAS L. REv. 688 (1947).
7. Grisby v. Coastal Marine Service of Texas, Inc., 235 F. Supp. 97,
109 (W.D. La. 1964): "If one's fault is a substantial factor in bringing about
harm to another, the fact that the actor neither foresaw nor should have
foreseen the extent of the harm or the manner in which it occurred does
not prevent him from being liable."
Lynch v. Fisher, 34 So.2d 513, 518 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1948): "We think
it is well established that the general doctrine of foreseeability is not
applicable to the extent of relieving one who sets in motion, through the
agency of a negligent act, a chain of circumstances leading to the final
resultant injury."
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 435 (1965).

1968]

COMMENTS

duty." It has even been held that the rescue of an unsuccessful
rescuer who has himself become endangered is foreseeable.9 It
is unnecessary that defendant foresee the particular manner in
which the rescue is made; it is sufficient that the dangerous
situation in which he placed himself or others invites rescue.' 0
In the leading Louisiana case of Lynch v. Fisher," Fisher's
truck, parked on the highway at night without flares or warning lights, was struck from the rear by the Gunters' speeding automobile. Plaintiff, a passerby, extricated Gunter and
his wife from their burning car and returned for a floor mat
to use as a pillow for the wife's head. On the floor of the car
plaintiff found a pistol which he handed to Gunter. Temporarily
deranged by the shock of the accident, Gunter fired the pistol
striking plaintiff in the leg. The plaintiff sued both Fisher and
Gunter alleging his injuries had been caused by their concurrent
negligence. Sustaining Gunter's exception of no cause of action,
the court held that the truck driver's negligence was the proximate cause of the rescuer's injury, that the doctrine of foreseeability 12 did not necessarily preclude recovery by plaintiff,
and that plaintiff could not be charged with contributory negligence in handing the pistol to Gunter.
Efforts to protect the personal safety of another do not
supersede the liability for the original negligence which has
endangered it.' 8 A defendant who negligently imperils a third
person also owes a duty of care to potential rescuers who may
8. See Bohlen, Book Review, 47 HARv. L. REv. 556, 557 (1934). See also
Usry v. Small, 103 Ga. App. 144, 118 S.E.2d 719 (1961); Lynch v. Fisher, 34
So.2d 513 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1948), modifted, 41 So.2d 692 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1949), 4 A.L.R.3d 558 (1965); Brugh v. Bigelow, 310 Mich. 74, 16 N.W.2d 668
(1944), Annot., 58 A.L.R. 184 (1945); Talbert v. Talbert, 22 Misc.2d 782,
199 N.Y.S.2d 212 (Sup. Ct. 1960) (defendant attempted suicide, and son was
injured trying to save him); Britt v. Mangum, 261 N.C. 250, 134 S.E.2d 235
(1964), Annot., 4 A.L.R.3d 551 (1965).
9. Richards v. Kansas Elec. Power Co., 126 Kan. 521, 268 P. 847 (1928);
Brown v. Ross, 345 Mich. 54, 75 N.W.2d 68 (1956).
10. Gambino v. Lubel, 190 So.2d 152 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1966), cert. denied,
191 So.2d 639, 640, 642 (1966); Talbert v. Talbert, 22 Misc.2d 782, 199 N.Y.S.2d
212 (Sup. Ct. 1960); Wagner v. International Ry., 232 N.Y. 176, 133 N.E. 437
(1921); Annot., 19 A.L.R. 1 (1922); Thomas v. Casey, 49 Wash. 2d 14, 297
P.2d 614 (1956).
11. 34 So.2d 513 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1948), modified, 41 So.2d 692 (La. App.
2d Cir. 1949); 4 A.L.R.3d 558 (1965); Note, 9 LA. L. Rsv. 421 (1949).
12. See note 7 supra.
13. 34 So.2d 513, 519 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1948): "In our opinion the original
act of negligence alleged upon is so inextricably interwoven with the subsequent occurrences involved that it cannot be disassociated from any of
them."
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intervene. 14 The duty to the rescuer is clearly an independent
one, which arises even when the defendant has endangered only
his own safety. 15 The duty owed to the rescuer applies even when
there is time for thought. 16
CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE

The rescuer is not barred from recovery by the contributory
negligence of the person rescued. 17 There must, however, be
negligence toward the person imperiled before there can be
negligence to the rescuer.' 8 A bystander does have a legitimate
interest in rescuing imperiled persons from imminent dangers
created by defendant's conduct. Contributory negligence is not
exposing oneself to risk, but to unreasonablerisk. If the rescuer's
intervention is not foolhardy, the trier of fact may properly find
that it was not unreasonable for plaintiff-rescuer to incur the
risks incident to the rescue operation. The leading cases on
the rescue doctrine hold that it is not contributory negligence
for a rescuer to expose himself to danger in a reasonable effort
to save another from harm.19 Whether the plaintiff-rescuer's
intervention is reasonable will be judged by the standard of 2a0
reasonably prudent man in the presence of another's peril.
The rescuer's intervention is an expectable response to the situation created by defendant's negligence or assumption of risk.21
In

Gambino v. Lubel,22 a recent Louisiana decision, a

14. Grisby v. Coastal Marine Service of Texas, Inc., 235 F. Supp. 97
(W.D. La. 1964); Lynch v. Fisher, 34 So.2d 513 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1948),
modified, 41 So.2d 692 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1949), 4 A.L.R.3d 558 (1965); Brugh v.
Bigelow, 310 Mich. 74, 16 N.W.2d 668 (1944); Annot., 158 A.L.R. 184 (1945),
§ 228 (1941); 65A C.J.S.
4 A.L.R.3d 560 (1965); 38 AM. JUR. NEOLGU:Ncn
Negligence § 124 (1966).
15. See note 10 supra.
16. See Wagner v. International Ry., 232 N.Y. 176, 133 N.E. 437 (1921).
17. See Pittsburgh, C., C. & St. L. Ry. v. Lynch, 69 Ohio 123, 68 N.E.
703 (1903); Highland v. Wilsonian Inv. Co., 171 Wash. 34, 17 P.2d 631 (1932).
18. See Brady v. Chicago & N. W. R.R., 265 Wis. 618, 62 N.W.2d 415
(1954); Rose v. Peters, 82 So.2d 585 (Fla. 1955). Norris v. Atlantic Coast
Line R.R., 152 N.C. 505, 513, 67 S.E. 1017, 1021 (1910): "[1It is well established
that, when the life of a human being is suddenly subjected to imminent peril
through another's negligence, either a comrade or a bystander may attempt
to save it, and his conduct is not subjected to the same exacting rules
which obtain under ordinary conditions; nor should contributory negligence
on the part of the imperiled person be allowed as a rule to affect the
question."
19. See Butler v. Jersey Coast News Co., 109 N.J.L. 255, 160 A. 659
(1932); Eckert v. Long Island R.R., 43 N.Y. 502, 3 Am. Rep. 721 (1871).
20. See Parks v. Starks, 342 Mich. 443, 70 N.W.2d 805 (1955).
21. See Cafone v. Spiniello Constr. Co., 42 N.J. Super. 590, 127 A.2d 441
(App. Div. 1956); Thomas v. Casey, 49 Wash. 2d 14, 297 P.2d 615 (1956).
22. 190 So.2d 152 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 191 So.2d 639,
640, 642 (1966). See Hicks v. Nelson, 182 So.2d 151 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1966),
where plaintiff's truck was struck from the rear while engaged in pulling
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diabetic motorist consciously in need of insulin continued driving. He became unconscious, and his car stopped with the
engine still running. An investigating policeman attempted to
aid the defendant and was injured when the latter revived and
accelerated the automobile forward. The policeman was viewed
as a rescuer and was not charged with contributory negligence
for failing to turn off the ignition. The court stated:
"A rescuer is favored in the eyes of the law and is not
chargeable with negligence merely because he failed to make
the wisest choice to accomplish the purpose. The cause of
an injury to a rescuer is the fault which created the peril
'28
to those whom he attempts to aid.
In Hammonds v. Haven,24 a tree was blown across the road
on a dark, rainy night. To warn oncoming drivers, plaintiff
went to the center of the road and waved his arms. Defendant
negligently ran down plaintiff. In allowing recovery, the court
held that under the rescue doctrine conduct which might otherwise be considered contributory negligence may not be so considered where a person is injured in attempting to save others
from imminent danger of personal injury or death; since persons are justified in assuming greater risks in protecting human
life than they would otherwise be, a rescuer is not guilty of
contributory negligence in exposing himself to danger in attempting to save others from serious harm if, in similar circumstances,
a reasonably prudent man would so expose himself. The rescue
doctrine was found applicable though the defendant did not
create the danger, since defendant was found guilty of negligence
as to the plaintiff-rescuer after the attempted rescue had commenced.
The rescue doctrine has been thus extended by applying its
principles where defendant was not negligent until after plaintiffanother vehicle from a ditch at night. Plaintiff had watched the defendant's

automobile approaching over a quarter mile straight stretch of highway
toward

the

highway

obstruction

created

by plaintiff's

vehicle

and

the

other vehicle without taking steps to warn oncoming traffic. The court
held plaintiff contributorily negligent.
23. Hicks v. Nelson, 182 So.2d 151, 157 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1966).

Henne-

man v. McCalla, 148 N.W.2d 447, 454 (Iowa 1967): "[O]ne who sees a person
in imminent and serious peril cannot be charged with contributory negligence, as a matter of law, in risking his own life or serious injury in
attempting to effect a rescue, provided the attempt is not recklessly or
rashly made. In other words, in attempting to save the life of another,
one is justified in exposing himself to danger in a manner that under other
circumstances would deprive him of legal redress for any injury sustained."

24. 280 S.W.2d 814 (Mo. 1955).
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rescuer has begun his rescue effort. The law is interested in
encouraging rescue and does not penalize the instinct to save
those imminently imperiled. If the plaintiff-rescuer acts rationally, he is allowed to recover from a defendant who has negligently imperiled himself or a third person. 25
PROXIATE CAUSE
The principle that a reasonably prudent person may expose
himself to danger in an effort to protect human life without
breaking the legal chain of causation is well settled.26 The defendant's negligence in creating the dangerous situation may prop27
erly be found to be the proximate cause of plaintiff's injury.
In Parks v. Starks,28 defendant motorist negligently collided
with pillars supporting a canopy covering gasoline pumps. The
garage owner failed to barricade the canopy. The next day, in
attempting to warn some children of the dangerous condition,
the plaintiff-rescuer was injured when the canopy fell. In allowing recovery, the court held that a proximate cause is not necessarily the immediate cause or the cause closest in time to the
rescuer's injuries. It was for the jury to determine whether the
intervening omission of the garage owner, after a nine-hour
delay, to barricade and safeguard the premises was sufficiently
foreseeable to render defendant liable for the eventual harm to
the plaintiff-rescuer.
25. The rescue doctrine was applied in Ruth v. Ruth, 213 Tenn. 82, 372
S.W.2d 285 (1963), where plaintiff alleged that while he was an invitee on
defendant's premises, he responded to the latter's cries for help and was
injured in rescuing him from a burning room in which the defendant had
negligently used a volatile and inflammable substance in repairing an outboard motor. In Scott v. Texaco, Inc., 48 Cal. Rptr. 785 (1966), the plaintiff
stood in the left lane of the road behind an overturned car to warn oncoming vehicles. A vehicle stopped in the right lane, and the plaintiff
was struck by an oncoming truck which could not pass because both lanes
were blocked. The court held that the plaintiff was entitled to instruction
that she could recover under the rescue doctrine if she was acting reasonably as a rescuer and unless her conduct was rash and reckless.
See Dodson v. Maddox, 359 Mo. 742, 223 S.W.2d 434 (1949) (plaintiff was
allowed to invoke res ipsa loquitur in establishing defendant's negligence);
Reddick v. Longacre, 228 S.W.2d 264 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950); Corbin v. City of
Philadelphia, 195 Pa. St. 461, 45 A. 1070 (1900).
26. See Henneman v. McCalla, 148 N.W.2d 447 (Iowa 1967); Hatch v.
Small, 249 Wis. 183, 23 N.W.2d 460 (1946) (cut on the wrist from broken
window glass received by one of the persons who had been riding in an
automobile in attempting to right it after it had gone off the shoulder of
the road and overturned held to be the proximate result of the driver's
negligence in operating the automobile).
27. Lynch v. Fisher, 34 So.2d 513, 517 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1948): "The
proximate cause of the injury to one who voluntarily interposes to save the
lives of persons Imperiled by the negligence of others is the negligence
which causes the peril."
28. 342 Mich. 443, 70 N.W.2d 805 (1955).
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When the defendant is negligent, the chain of negligence is
not broken by the act of rescue. 29 A proximate cause does not
have to be the immediate cause of injury for the term connotes
simply a legally responsible cause, whether or not the immediate
or more remote cause of harm.30 Even though defendant's act
may be more remote in the chain of events than other causes,
it can be held the proximate cause of plaintiff's harm.31
SUmMARY OF ToRTious LIABILITY

Judicial adoption of common law tort concepts in all American jurisdictions has resulted in the development of the general
rules applied in the rescue cases. A rescuer injured while reasonably undertaking a rescue may recover from the rescued
person or a third person if the negligence of either created the
32
situation necessitating the rescue or causing the rescuer's injury.
One who sees a person in serious peril will not be charged with
contributory negligence in risking his own safety unless he is
reckless or rash.3 3 To justify one in risking death or serious
29. See note 11 supra and accompanying text.
30. See Bohlen, Book Review, 47 HARV. L. REV. 556 (1934).
31. See note 28 supra and accompanying text.
32. It has been held that the rescuer may not recover where his injury
is an abnormal one, not reasonably to be expected as a result of the situa-

tion. Whitman v. Mobile & 0. R.R., 217 Ala. 70, 114 So. 912 (1927) (wrenching side carrying water to extinguish fire). But compare the unusual events
for which recovery was allowed in Hines v. Morrow, 236 S.W. 183 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1921); St. Louis-San Francisco R.R. v. Ginn, 264 P.2d 351 (Okla.
1953); cf. Lynch v. Fisher, note 11 supra and accompanying text.
The only major case denying recover to the rescuer is Saylor v. Parsons,
122 Iowa 679, 98 N.W. 500 (1904). The plaintiff was injured when, in carrying

out his duties as an employee in removing a structure, he threw the prop
supporting his side of the wall against the top of the wall, which appeared
to be toppling upon the defendant, who was overseeing the work. The
latter was saved, but the plaintiff sustained severe personal injuries when
the wall caved in upon him. He sued the defendant and the employer. The
Iowa court held that the defendant had violated no legal duty in placing
himself in a position of danger; and, since the employer had not been
negligent as to him, it could not have been negligent as to his rescuer.
It pointed out that since defendant apparently felt that he was able to
perform his work with safety to himself, he should not be charged with
anticipating that someone would attempt to rescue him. This view has been
invariably rejected since this case. See generally Annot., 4 A.L.R.3d 551
(1965). See RESTATEMENT (SECOND)

OF TORTS § 445, comment d (1965).

33. Henneman v. McCalla, 148 N.W.2d 447, 455 (Iowa 1967): "[Ilt is not
contributory negligence for a person to expose himself to danger in order
to rescue another from peril if, under the circumstances, an ordinarily prudent person might so expose himself in order to save another from harm.
The test is whether the conduct of the rescuer was 'natural' or whether
he acted with reasonable prudence under the peculiar circumstances then
existing."

Rescuers acting in a foolish and extraordinary manner cannot be
regarded as any normal part of the original risk; thus, in these cases,
they will be considered a superseding cause. Atchison, T. & S. F. R.R. v.
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injury, however, the danger threatened must be imminent and
real, and not merely imaginary or speculative.

4

If the rescuer

himself brought about the danger necessitating the rescue, he is
not relieved from the contributory negligence defense. 85 If the
rescuer has time to deliberate upon his course of action, but
instead acts impulsively, the causal connection between the
defendant's negligence and the rescuer's injury is viewed as
unbroken, the proximate cause of the injury being the negligence
which caused the peril.86
OTHER THEORIES

Other possible theories applicable to the rescue cases have
generally been ignored by the courts. These are the common law
quasi contract principle and the civilian negotiorum gestio doctrine. In Webb v. McGowin7 the Alabama appellate court based
Calhoun, 213 U.S. 1 (1909) (injuring child in hopeless effort to catch train);
Robinson v. Butler, 226 Minn. 491, 33 N.W.2d 821 (1948) (excited passenger
seizing wheel); cf. Cummings v. General Motors Corp., 146 Conn. 443, 151
A.2d 884 (1959). See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 472 (1965).

34. See Cote v. Palmer, 127 Conn. 321, 16 A.2d 595 (1940); Arnold v.
Northern States Power Co., 209 Minn. 551, 297 N.W. 182 (1941); Franklin
v. Lowe, 389 P.2d 1012 (Wyo. 1964).
35. See Tarnowski v. Fite, 335 Mich. 267, 55 N.W.2d 824 (1952); Hicks
v. Nelson, 182 So.2d 151 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1966); see note 22 supra.
36. Wagner v. International R.R., 232 N.Y. 176, 181, 133 N.E. 437, 438
(1921): "The law does not discriminate between the rescuer oblivious of
peril and the one who counts the cost. It is enough that the act, whether
impulsive or deliberate, is the child of the occasion." See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 449, 294 (1965). See also Note, 16 FORDHAM L. REV. 139
(1947).
37. 168 So. 196 (Ala. App. 1935). Id. at 197-99: "Any holding that saving
a man from death or grievous bodily harm is not a material benefit sufficient to uphold a subsequent promise to pay for the service, necessarily
rests on the assumption that saving life and preservation of the body from
harm have only a sentimental value. The converse of this is true. Life and
preservation of the body have material, pecuniary values, measurable in
dollars and cents. Because of this, physicians practice their profession charging for services rendered in saving life and curing the body of its ills, and
surgeons perform operations. The same is true as to the law of negligence,
authorizing the assessment of damages in personal injury cases based upon
the extent of the injuries, earnings, and life expectancies of those injured.
"[Ihf . . . appellant saved J. Greely McGowin from death or grievous
bodily harm, and McGowin subsequently agreed to pay him for the service
rendered, it became a valid and enforceable contract.
"[In cases where the promisor, having received a material benefit from
the promisee, is morally bound to compensate him for the services rendered
and in

consideration of this obligation . . . to pay . . . the

subsequent

promise to pay is an affirmance or ratification of the services rendered
carrying with it the presumption that a previous request for the service
was made.

"... McGowin's express promise to pay appellant for the services rendered was an affirmance or ratification of what appellant had done raising
the presumption that the services had been rendered at McGowin's request.
"Under the averments of the complaint the services rendered by appel-
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recovery on quasi contract rather than tort theory. A workman
clearing the upper floor of a mill started to drop a large block
to the ground. Upon seeing a person on the ground where the
block would have fallen, the worker fell with the block to
divert its course. As he sustained injuries causing permanent
disability, the person rescued agreed to compensate the worker
fifteen dollars every two weeks for the rest of the worker's
life. 88 This situation, of course, is to be distinguished from the
case where there is no promise by the rescued person to compensate the rescuer. The court stated that saving a man from
death or grievous bodily harm was sufficient "consideration" to
uphold a subsequent promise to pay. 89
The unanswered question that must be explored is whether
the moral obligation of the person rescued is sufficient to allow
recovery in the absence of a promise to pay. No other case
could be found in which recovery by the rescuer was allowed
under the quasi contract theory. All other cases have based
recovery on tort principles. It is submitted that a rescuer's
chances of recovery would be measurably improved if his claim
was predicated on the quasi contract principle rather than tort.
Relief against the person rescued under the tort remedy requires
that the defendant must have been negligent either in creating
the perilous situation or in causing injury to the rescuer during
the attempt. The quasi contract obligation generally arises, however, without reference to the "assent" of the obligor and requires
lant were not gratuitous. The agreement

of McGowin to pay and the

acceptance of payment by appellant conclusively shows the contrary.
"Benefit to the promisor [the rescued] or injury to the promisee [the
rescuer] is a sufficient legal consideration for the promisor's agreement to
pay."
Id. at 199-200: "We agree with that court [Court of Appeals] that if the
benefit be material and substantial, and was to the person of the promisor

rather than to his estate it is within the class of material benefits which
he has the privilege of recognizing and compensating either by an executed
payment or an executory promise to pay. The cases are cited in that
opinion. The reason is emphasized when the compensation is not only for
the benefits which the promisor received, but also for the injuries either
to the property or person of the promisee by reasons of the service rendered."

38. In allowing recovery against the heirs of the deceased obligor, the
court said, id. at 197: "Receiving this benefit [saving him from death or
grievous bodily harm], McGowin became morally bound to compensate
appellant for the services rendered. Recognizing his moral obligation, he

expressly agreed to pay appellant as alleged in the complaint and complied
with this agreement up to the time of his death; a period of more than
eight years."
39. Id. at
consideration
has received
bility resting

(Emphasis added.)
198: "It is well settled that a moral obligation is a sufficient
to support a subsequent promise to pay where the promisor
a material benefit although there was no original duty or liaon the promisor."
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the obligor to make restitution even where his negligence has
not been proved.
The basis of quasi contract obligation at common law is
unjust enrichment, an obligation created only when one has
"benefited" from another's performance. Under the common law
concept of quasi contract it would seem that a rescuer would
have to be successful in his efforts to "benefit" the imperiled
party so as to create an obligation. The civilian concept of quasi
contract is based upon whether or not one's act is "useful" to
another at the time of its performance. Apparently, a rescuer
in a civilian jurisdiction, as Louisiana, would quasi contractually
bind the person he is attempting to rescue whether or not the
efforts are successful. Under either approach the necessity of
having to prove the obligor's negligence is obliterated-a clear
advantage over the tort approach. Also, if negligence can be
proven, the rescuer could base his claim on both tort and quasi
contractual principles and thus double his chances of recovery.
Quasi contracts at common law are imposed by the law without
reference to the assent of the obligor.40 They arise from the
receipt by one person from another of a benefit the retention
of which is unjust, and are based on equitable considerations
enforceable by legal remedies. The obligor is bound, not because
he has promised to make restitution-he may even have explicitly
refused to promise-but because he has been unjustly enriched,
that is, he has received a benefit, the retention of which would
be inequitable. In Louisiana in considering whether the plaintiff has performed a "useful" act it is sufficient to show that
he has acted in a way desired by the defendant, and the question
of whether the defendant is enriched "in fact" is irrelevant. Even
an unsuccessful rescuer in Louisiana would seem to have a quasi
contractual cause of action.
Quasi contracts are unlike the duty not to commit a tort,
but are similar to most contracts in that the obligor is required
to act rather than to forbear. Quasi contracts are particular
obligations, that is, they are imposed because of a special state
of facts and in favor of a particular person. The duty not to
commit a tort is universal; it rests upon one at all times and in
favor of all persons. It is easier to prove the existence of a quasi
contractual obligation than the commitment of a tort since the
former is correlated to a determinate right in personam of some
40. RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION §§ 112-117 (1937).
CONTRACTS §§ 270-300 (1913).

See WOODWARD, QUASI
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other person, while the latter is not correlated to any determinate right, either in personam or in rem-only to the general
right in rem of every one that no tort shall be committed against
him.
Because of the public interest in the performance of rescues,
it is submitted that there is a legal obligation on those in need
of help, independent of express contract, to pay for damages
suffered by another in an emergency rescue attempt. Even
though a rescuer usually is prompted by motives of humanity
and intends his services to be gratuitous, the rescued person is
under a legal obligation to compensate for injury to the rescuer
since "danger invites rescue" 41 and unjust enrichment would
otherwise result, the rescued party having clearly benefited from
the rescue or attempted rescue. Where a third party has created
the peril, both the third party and the rescued person would be
under a legal obligation to indemnify the rescuer. In rescuing
another, the rescuer is benefiting the negligent third person
by possibly relieving him of further liability to the person being
rescued. Without a contract at common law there is no legal
obligation to pay for non-professional services rendered in the
preservation of life, the presumption being that the services
are intended to be gratuitous. 42 However, this presumption does
not imply that a rescuer injured while attempting to rescue is
not entitled to recovery from the person in peril. A person who
has attempted to preserve another's life or health, although acting
without the other's knowledge or consent, could feasibly be
entitled to restitution from the other for damages received in the
act of rescuing.
In the Roman law one of the principal classes of quasicontractual obligations was negotiorum gestio.43 Under this doc41. See note 5 supra and accompanying text.
42. See note 40 supra.
43. The negotiorum gestio doctrine was stated in the Institutes of Justinian 3, 27, I: "Thus, if one man has managed the business of another
during the latter's absence, each can sue the other by the action on uncommissioned agency; the direct action being available to him whose business
was managed, the contrary action to him who managed it. It is clear
that these actions cannot properly be said to originate in a contract, for
their peculiarity is that they lie only where one man has come forward
and managed the business of another without having received any commission so to do, and that other is thereby laid under legal obligation even
though he knows nothing of what has taken place. The reason of this
is the general convenience; otherwise people might be summoned away
by some sudden event of pressing importance, and without commissioning
any one to look after and manage their affairs, the result of which would
be that during their absence those affairs would be entirely neglected;
and of course no one would be likely to attend to them if he were to have
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44
trine, which has been retained in the modern continental codes
4
and in the law of Louisiana, 5 one who intervenes in the management of another's affairs in response to a sense of duty, though
not required by law, and performs a "useful" act for which the
recipient ought to pay, is entitled to compensation. According
to Planiol, negotiorum gestio is applicable where one is injured
while trying to stop a runaway horse or taking a wounded horse
to a doctor. 46 If the rescuer-gestor fails in his attempt to rescue

no action for the recovery of any outlay he might have incurred in so
doing. Conversely, as the uncommissioned agent, if his management is
good, lays his principal under a legal obligation, so too he is himself answerable to the latter for an account of his management; and herein he must
show that he has satisfied the highest standard of carefulness, for to have
displayed such carefulness as he is wont to exercise in his own affairs is
not enough, if only a more diligent person could have managed the business
better." SCOTT,

CASES

ON

QUASI

CONTRACTS

1,

translating

Du OBLIGATIONIBUS

See Lorenzen, The Negotiorum
Gestio in Roman and Modern Civil Law, 13 CORN. L.Q. 190 (1928).
44. See Dawson, Negotiorum Gestio: The Altruistic Intermeddler, 74
HARv. L. REV. 817 (1961); Lorenzen, The Negotiorum Gestio in Roman and
Modern Civil Law, 13 CORN. L.Q. 190 (1928).
45. LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 2293-2300 (1870). Cf. Minyard v. Curtis Products,
Inc., 205 So.2d 422, 427 (La. 1968): "The device employed by the courts to
grant relief has sometime been the civil law action de in rem verso. Garland v. Scott's Estate, 15 La. Ann. 143 (1860); Payne v. Harrison & Scott,
14 La. Ann. 760 (1859), which is an action for unjust enrichment." 205 So.2d
at 432: "There are now five prerequisites to the successful suit by actio de
in rem verso: (1) there must be an enrichment, (2) there must be an impoverishment, (3) there must be a connection between the enrichment and
resulting impoverishment, (4) there must be an absence of 'justification' or
,cause' for the enrichment and impoverishment, and finally (5) the action
will only be allowed when there is no other remedy at law, i.e., the action
is subsidiary or corrective in nature. 36 TUL. L. REV. 605, 610." See Comment,
7 TUL. L. REV. 253 (1933).
QUASI

EX CONTRACTU,

bk. III, tit. 27 (1932).

46. 2 PLANIOL, CIVIL LAW TREATISE (AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION BY THE LOuSTATE LAW INSTITUTE) no. 2273 (1959): "There is 'gestio d'affaires' in

ISIANA

every case where a person accomplishes a juridical act in the interest of
another without having been charged to do so. It is considered as a quasicontract." Id. no. 2274: "[I]t seemed indispensable to separate the 'gestio
d'affaires' properly so called, from cases invoking not juridical acts, but
services or material advantages procured for or rendered to another.
Thus the jurisprudence considers as a 'gestio d'affaires' the fact of having,
by a material act, procured the enrichment of another (Cass., 16 July 1890,
D.91.149)." See also Trib. Seine, 3 Jan. 1900, S. 1902.2.217 and Dijon, 12 June
1928, D.H. 1928, 488.
Id. no. 2274A: "[IUn certain cases the jurisprudence has admitted that
there was an act of management by the sole fact that there was a useful
intervention in the affairs of another (see the study of M. Picard, Rev.
trimestrielle, 1922, and the decisions reported)."
According to id. no. 2279 the gestio d'affaires is validated when it has
been useful and ratified. In particular cases the usefulness procured for
the master dispenses with ratification.
Id. no. 2280: "The determination of whether the management has been
useful or not must be made as of the time the different acts of management
took place. The usefulness of the intervention of the manager may well
disappear in the light of subsequent events, that does not compromise the
juridical effects. Classic example: repairs made to a house which subsequently was accidentally burned."
Id. no. 2281: The master whose affair was usefully managed, or who
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he still may be entitled to recover as long as he acted reasonably under the existing circumstances because the imperiled
47
person has been the recipient of "useful" efforts.
In all civil matters, where there is no express law, the judge
is bound to decide according to equity. 48 No one ought to "enrich"
himself at the expense of another. 49 According to the Louisiana
Civil Code, obligations which arise by operation of law form
quasi contracts. 50 The general concept of quasi contractual obligations in Louisiana is based upon the principle that where there
is a "useful" act by one for another, then the value of that act
must be restituted.51 Basically, any action for indemnification not
based on contract is a claim in quasi contract, and usually inratifies the management . . . should indemnify the [manager] for all the
expenses and charges of the management, "for all the useful or necessary
expenses he incurred," says Art. 1375. He should, in addition, if the manager
has personally contracted obligations to third persons, procure his discharge,
'indemnify them for them,' says Art. 1375."
Id. no. 2282: "[The master's] obligation arises without any voluntary
act on his part; it is independent of his capacity."
47. Comment, 7 TUL. L. REV. 253, 257 (1933): "In order for the negotiorum
gestio to recover his expenses, there need only have been some advantage
to the principal at the time of the act; a later failure of the expected benefit
under the act is of no moment." LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2299 (1870): "Equity
obliges the owner, whose business has been well managed, to comply with
the engagements contracted by the manager, in his name; to indemnify
the manager in all the personal engagements he has contracted; and to
reimburse him all useful and necessary expenses. (Emphasis added.)
Webre v. Graugnard, 173 La. 653, 658, 138 So. 433, 435 (1931): "[W]hen
a man takes upon himself the management of the affairs of another as a
friend, not for his own benefit and advantage and not against the will but
solely in the interest of another, he is a negotiorum gestor."
Applicability of the doctrine of negotiorum gestio Is a question of fact.
Woodlief & Legendre v. Moncure, 17 La. Ann. 241, 242 (1865). The fact that
the person is incapable of consent is irrelevant because obligations will
attach, nevertheless, under LA. CIvIL CODE art. 2300 (1870). See Thompson v.
Louisiana Central Lumber Co., 2 La. App. 200 (2d Cir. 1925).
48. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 21 (1870).
49. Id. art. 1965. See also Oscar v. Louisiana State Ins. Co., 5 Mart. (N.S.)
386, 392 (1827): [N]o one is permitted to profit by the labor of another,
without compensating him for it. Jure naturae equum est, neminem cum
alterius deterimento et injuria fieri locupletiorem. On this principle, the
Roman jurists held, that he who acted for another by transacting his
business, or by making repairs on his property, could recover the amount of
the expenses incurred, or the value of the repairs; provided the acts of the
negotiorum gestor were necessary and useful to the person for whom he
acted. This doctrine has descended to us, and makes a part of the positive
legislation of the state. Dig. Liv. 50, tit. 17; L. 206; ibid. Liv. 3, tit. 5; L. 10
*10, 8, 1; Toullier, Droit civil Frangais, vol. 11, tit. 4, cp. 1, no. 49; C. Code.
2274 and 2278."
50. LA. CIvIL CODE art. 2293 (1870): "Quasi contracts are the lawful and
purely voluntary act of a man, from which there results any obligation
whatever to a third person, and sometimes a reciprocal obligation between
the parties."
os
51. PLANIOL, TRAIT9 ALENTAIRE Dr DROIT CIVIL, T. 2, n
812, 813 (8th ed.
1939). See Minyard v. Curtis Products, Inc., 205 So.2d 422, 432 (La. 1968).
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volves some type of unjust "enrichment. 5 2 To assert validly
quasi contractual principles the plaintiff-rescuer must allege and
prove that as a result of some sacrifice or act on his part he has
procured an advantage for the defendant. 5
Acts of beneficial intervention may result either from the
discharge of another's legal obligation or the preservation of
another's life or property. It may be dutiful to preserve another's
property if the danger to the property is so imminent that notice
cannot effectively be given to the owner or the owner needs
54
assistance to preserve it.
FRENCH DOCTRINE
The majority of French writers consider that the gestion
d'affaire (negotiorum gestio) may consist as well in the accomplishment of a material fact as in a juridical act.5 5 French jurisprudence, conforming to Roman tradition, has always considered
that the act of management may result from the accomplishment of a material act. It thus gives the gestion d'affaire a vast
field of application. A gestor's actions might include, for example,
an undertaking to preserve the property of another, stopping a
runaway horse, or aiding a motorist in difficulty. In all these
cases it is on the basis of principles of gestion d'affaire that the
gestor will reclaim indemnification for expenses or for his
injuries.5 6 There is a gestion d'affaire, and consequently the creation of obligations from the act of management, only if it has
been useful to the master. The utility of the act is to be determined at the moment it is accomplished, for it is possible that
by virtue of subsequent events the master will not realize the
enrichment. For example, if an immovable upon which the
gestor has undertaken indispensable repairs is destroyed by
accident, the uninsured and completely unprotected owner is
obligated to the gestor though there was no actual enrichment,
52. Minyard v. Curtis Products, Inc., 205 So.2d 422, 431 (La. 1968).
53. Id. at 432.

54. A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 234 (1952): "[A] farmer's bull has strayed and
is in danger of being totally lost or destroyed. A stranger impounds the
bull, feeds him, and saves him for the

farmer. By the Roman law, the

farmer is bound to pay reasonable compensation for the benefit received
(negotiorum gestio). He may be bound by the Anglo-American law, also, if
we search the cases in equity as well as in indebitatus assumpsit. If he is

so bound quasi-contractually, that legal duty is a sufficient basis for the
farmer's express promise to pay compensation." See A. Corbin, QuasiContractual Obligations, 21 YALE L.J. 533 (1912); RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION

§

1, at 112-17 (1937).
55. MAZEAUD, LEgONS DE DROIT civiL no. 678 (J. Smith transl. 1955).

56. Id. no. 680.
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because the gestor's act was useful at the moment when it was
performed. 57
In a French case58 plaintiff was burned about the face and
arms when a motorcycle gas tank exploded as he was attempting
to put out a fire that occurred when the owner of the motorcycle
tried to start it. Basing recovery on gestion d'affaire,59 the court
held that compensable action does not solely require a juridical
act of representation or administration but may stem from
activity spontaneously performed in the interest of a third person
if it is useful 60 at the moment the management is undertaken.
It appeared to plaintiff that he could prevent the extension of
a fire which could involve serious responsibility on the part of
defendant in the event the fire was communicated to neighboring buildings. The court found justification for holding that by
his intervention plaintiff acted in a useful fashion for defendant,
and that the latter should indemnify plaintiff for the injuries
he suffered. 61
The purpose of the rules of the gestion d'affaire is to encourage persons to render service to others by attending to neglected
affairs.6 2 The master must indemnify the gestor with respect
to all the expenses he has incurred, interest on his advances, the
engagements he has contracted in his own name, and damage
(e.g., injuries) which he has sustained from the act of management. Though the gestion d'affaire is gratuitous in principle, and
the gestor is not entitled to general compensation, the gestor is
83
permitted to claim remuneration for expenses or injuries.
57. Id. no. 683.
58. Decoster v. Dhullu, Trib. Civil de Lille, 28 June 1955, Gaz. Pal.
1955.2.413 (J. Smith transl. 1955)
59. Plaintiff based his first cause of action on article 1384, paragraph
2 of the French Civil Code, which deals with injuries resulting from things.
This cause of action was rejected on the ground that the article in question
had been modified by an act of 1922 which required a friding of fault for
injuries resulting from a fire. The court found no fault on the part of the
owner of the motorcycle in trying to start it. The court likewise rejected
the second cause of action, which was based also on a theory of fault having
created a state of emergency. Although the case does not indicate it, this
cause of action was apparently based on article 1382 of the French Civil
Code. The claim was rejected because of the finding that the defendant was
free of fault. Gas. Req. 4 Dec. 1940, Gaz. Pal. 1940.2.328, was cited as authority.
60. The act of management, although it does not enrich the owner, was
useful at the time of its performance.
61. An editorial note to the case approving the holding as an equitable
application of prior jurisprudence cited Gaz. Pal. 1926.1.119 and Note, Gaz.
Pal. T.Z. 1931-1945 v ° gestion d'affaire no. 4-D. Anal. 1943.83; Gas. Pal. T. Q.
1946-1950, eod. v ° no. 6
62. MAZEAUD, LEgONS DE DROIT cIVIL no 684 (J. Smith transl. 1955).

63. Id. n* 690.
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No fault being attributable to the gestor when the management conforms to the rules of the Civil Code, the gestion d'affaire
may not be considered as an application of the principles of civil
responsibility. The obligations resulting from the gestion d'affaire
are not strictly legal obligations, but arise by operation of law.
Although resting on the principle of equity that no one
should enrich himself at the expense of another, the obligations of a rescued party do not arise by being saved from injury
or death, but because he is bound to indemnify the rescuergestor for performing a useful act in his interest even though
the act may not have actually caused enrichment.6 4 While common law quasi contractual obligations require a finding of "unjust
enrichment" on the part of the benefactor, negotiorum gestio
requires only that the management have been "useful" at the
time of its performance.
CONCLUSION

Fisher6 5

the person rescued shot his rescuer but
In Lynch v.
was not proven to be negligent in causing the wreck or in shooting his rescuer-thus, the rescuer had no cause of action against
him. Under quasi contract or negotiorum gestio principles the
rescuer would have had a cause of action against both the truck
driver whose negligence caused the original wreck and against
the rescued person. The rescue is beneficial to the third party
tortfeasor whose liability to the rescued person may be diminished by the rescue and beneficial to the rescued person simply
because his life was saved or an attempt was made to save it.
6
It is suggested that Louisiana could follow the French in
allowing a rescuer to recover under the civilian negotiorum
gestio theory.67 By applying the civilian quasi contract princi°
64. Id. n 692.
65. See note 11 supra and accompanying text; cf. Edwards v. Louisiana
Forestry Comm'n, 221 La. 818, 60 So.2d 449 (1952), where the Louisiana
Supreme Court awarded workmen's compensation to a towerman who was
injured while attempting to rescue a stranger. The claimant suffered a
hernia when he attempted to rush down the stairs of the tower to save a
child who was being attacked by a dog on the ground below. The court
emphasized that rescues are within the scope of those things it is contemplated that the employee will do and that they spring from a moral duty
resting upon humanitarian principles.
66. See notes 57-65 supra and accompanying text.
67. See note 46 supra; Lorenzen, The Negotiorum Gestio in Roman and
Modern Civil Law, 13 CoRN. L.Q. 191, 209-210 (1928): "The negotiorum gestio
has been found to be a very flexible and useful tool for the promotion of
the ends of justice; it has enabled quasi-contractual recovery in countries
in which the law of quasi-contracts was not fully developed, it has been the
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ples, a Louisiana rescuer could double his chances of recovery by
basing his claim on both tort and quasi contract. Equity obliges
the beneficiary to indemnify his benefactor. Although the majority of both common law and Louisiana cases have based recovery
under the rescue doctrine on tort principles, the doctrine of
quasi contract (restitution) could be applied in common law
jurisdictions and negotiorum gestio (the civilian quasi contractual doctrine) in Louisiana. The rescuer need not prove negligence of the defendant under quasi contract or negotiorum gestio
as is presently necessary under the tort principles. The courts
have based the rescue doctrine on tort whether the rescuer has
sought recovery against the person rescued, or the negligent
third person who created the danger, or both of them. The
doctrine of quasi contract could be applied in the same cases
with the added advantage that the rescuer need only prove
unjust enrichment of the rescued person and/or third party.6
Edward A. Kaplan

FIXING LIMITS, AND SURVEYING LAND
The objective of this Comment is to relate the engineer's
role in surveying lands and fixing boundaries to the lawyer's
role in determining the legal rights of the parties resulting from
means of affording relief in all countries of the civil law in situations where

special rules of Equity and especially those relating to constructive trusts
would be invoked in Anglo-American law.
"There is a negotiorum gestio according to French law, if the following
conditions exist:

(1)

the

intervention

must not have proceeded from a

purely egotistical thought; (2) the intervention must not conflict with the
legitimate opposition of
useful to the principal.
the gestor, but into his
If the act is profitable
intend to serve his own

the principal; (3) the intervention must have been
The courts no longer inquire into the intention of
act, which they appreciate in a spirit of liberality.
to another, they presume that the gestor did not
ends exclusively." (Emphasis added.) Id. at 207.

68. The basic reasons possibly why the courts have failed to utilize a

quasi contract remedy, despite its conceptual availabilty, have to do with

the reasons why in Louisiana the courts have generally characterized suits
for personal injuries as tort actions prescriptible within one year (See LA.
CIvIL CODE art. 3536 (1870), rather than contractual actions prescriptible in ten

years as personal actions (see Id. art. 3544), even in cases where the personal
injuries could have been described as resulting from breach of a contractual

obligation. These have been dictated by policy reasons underlying the
shorter prescriptive period for tort actions (medical examinations concurrent with injuries and others) than for contract actions. The ultimate answer
may be to have by statute a general prescriptive period applicable in any
event insofar as the claim seeks recovery for personal injury damages while

permitting conceptual characterization of actions as either tort, contract,

or quasi contract. This reasoning was suggested to the writer by Judge
Albert Tate, Jr., Presiding Judge, Louisiana Court of Appeal, Third Circuit,
on leave of absence to serve as Professor of Law, Louisiana State University, 1967-68.

